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I
INTRODUCTION
The dramatic rise in the incidence of malpractice claims over the past thirty
years has revealed several problems with the U.S. system of medical dispute
resolution.  First, the sudden and unexpected increase in claims has created an
insurance crisis wherein various medical specialists have had difficulty obtain-
ing affordable insurance coverage.1  One such crisis occurred in Florida in the
mid-1980’s, when an inability of many physicians to procure medical malprac-
tice coverage caused some to limit or curtail their practice.  This resulted in ac-
cess problems for the public.  This phenomenon has disproportionately befallen
physicians practicing obstetric medicine.2  Second, besides contributing to peri-
odic crises of access, the current medical dispute resolution system is often re-
sponsible for long delays in resolving claims and in compensating victims.3
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1. See Frank A. Sloan & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Crises, Response, and Effects,
HEALTH INS. ASS’N AM. RES. BULL. (Health Ins. Ass’n Am., Wash., D.C.), May 1989.  Although cur-
rently in the middle of a relatively soft insurance market (slow growth of claims and payments with
readily available coverage), it is likely that claims and payments will increase dramatically over the
next decade.  The current focus on slowing the growth of health spending is likely to anger American
health care consumers who experience adverse events and wonder whether their outcomes are related
to restrictions on referrals, reduced lengths of stay, or to a physician’s incentive to save money.  See,
e.g., Gerald. B. Hickson, Pediatric Practice and Liability Risk in a Managed Care Environment, 26
PEDIATRIC ANNALS 179 (1997); see also Marcel Frenkel, Capitation, Disease Management, and Physi-
cian Liability, 23 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 87 (1997).
2. In 1989, the Institute of Medicine reported that sizable numbers of physicians in every state
had eliminated obstetrics from their practice because of liability concerns.  See, e.g., INST. OF MED.,
The Effects of Medical Liability on Availability of Obstetrical Providers, in MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 35 (1989).
3. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF
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Third, compensation is sometimes inequitable, encouraging frivolous suits and
making the system expensive to operate.  Finally, while there is no evidence
that the system reduces bad care, it clearly contributes to increased cost by en-
couraging unjustified defensive medicine.4
A number of strategies have been proposed to reduce the incidence of mal-
practice claims by making it harder for individuals to file suit.  Recommended
solutions have included reducing the statute of limitations, promoting the use
of arbitration, and setting caps on awards and settlements, especially for pain
and suffering.5  Unfortunately, these strategies tend to make it more difficult
for everyone to sue.  Justice demands that patients and their families be able to
seek full compensation when patients have been injured by negligent medical
care and these proposed remedies could have the effect of chilling necessary
and beneficent litigation.  However, those injured by negligence represent a
small minority of the patients and families who actually file suit.6  Thus, the
challenge is to identify what can be done to reduce the number of unfounded
claims while simultaneously permitting legitimate claims to proceed.
What is needed are strategies and policies that reduce the likelihood that
individuals will pursue invalid claims.  To this end, it may be possible to de-
crease unwarranted litigation through an analysis of the origins of such law-
suits.  Numerous studies have highlighted the significance of poor patient-
physician rapport in promoting decisions to file suit.7  Other studies have dem-
onstrated that the incidence of claims is not random.  Instead, some physicians
attract a disproportionate share of malpractice claims.8  If such findings are
valid, it might be possible to develop a method to identify physicians at risk for
attracting suits, and intervene with them in a timely fashion to reduce sources
                                                          
CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Richard A. Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA
2776 (1987); A. Dale Tussing & Martha A. Wojtowycz, Malpractice, Defensive Medicine, and Obstetric
Behavior, 35 MED. CARE 172 (1997).  It is difficult to estimate the cost of defensive medicine.  Physi-
cians say that fear of being sued influences their care.  However, that may be more socially acceptable
than admitting that they have ordered an extra test or procedure because they cannot stand even slight
degrees of uncertainty in diagnosis or treatment.  Such motivations would exist even if physicians en-
joyed absolute immunity from civil liability.
5. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990’s: Past Disappointments, Future
Success?, 20 J.  HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 99 (1995); Jeffrey Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault
Compensation for Medical Injury: A Case Study, 14 HEALTH AFF. 164 (1995).
6. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA MED. ASS’N & CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE MEDICAL IN-
SURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (1977); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992) [hereinafter Hickson et al., Factors]; Ger-
ald B. Hickson et al., Obstetricians Prior Malpractice Experience and Patients’ Satisfaction with Care,
272 JAMA 1583 (1994) [hereinafter Hickson et al., Obstetricians]; Wendy Levinson & Debra L. Roter,
Physicians’ Psychosocial Beliefs Correlate with Their Patient Communication Skills, 10 J.  GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 375 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Kenneth P. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physicians’
Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict the Future?, 272 JAMA 1421
(1994); Frank A. Sloan et al., Medical Malpractice Experience of Physicians: Predictable or Haphaz-
ard?, 262 JAMA 3291 (1989).
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of patient dissatisfaction that lead to malpractice claims.
The purpose of this article is to describe the development of an early identi-
fication and response model of malpractice prevention that is designed to
achieve these objectives. The article begins with a rationale for the project.
Then it describes the development of a patient complaint analysis system
(“PCAS”)—a mechanism for identifying physicians who have complaint pat-
terns associated with higher than average risk of malpractice claims—and the
results of its use in a large physician multispecialty group.  The article then uses
PCAS data to support a peer interview approach to changing physician behav-
ior.  Finally, it discusses issues associated with attempting to foster changes in
physician behavior.
II
BACKGROUND
Justification for an early identification and response model of malpractice
prevention follows from what is known about the incidence of malpractice
claims, the reasons why people file suits, and the reasons that certain physicians
attract a disproportionate share of malpractice claims.  Two studies conducted
almost a decade apart both suggest that approximately one percent of hospi-
talized patients suffer injuries due to medical negligence.9  Both studies also
suggest that the overwhelming majority of individuals who are injured through
medical malfeasance choose not to sue.  In fact, the studies suggest that only
two to four percent of patients injured through negligence file claims.  At the
same time, five to six times as many patients who suffered injuries that are not
legally compensable also file malpractice claims.10  These studies raise impor-
tant questions: Why do the vast majority of patients injured through medical
negligence choose not to file suit, why do so many patients without valid claims
file suit?
Answers are provided by studies involving interviews with injured patients.
Marlynn May and Daniel Stengel compared the characteristics and complaints
of patients with adverse outcomes.  Those who had filed suit were compared to
patients who believed their outcomes were a result of unsatisfactory medical
care but who had chosen not to file suit.11  May and Stengel found that indi-
                                                          
9. See CALIFORNIA MED. ASS’N & CAL. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 6; see also Brennan et al., su-
pra note 6.  A more recent study by Andrews and colleagues suggests that the percentage of hospital-
ized patients who suffer iatrogenic injury on surgical wards may be substantially higher.  Previous
studies were based on chart reviews. See Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying
Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309 (1997).  Andrews and colleagues used teams of eth-
nographers who actually spent time in the hospital.  If their conclusions are correct, the proportion of
injured patients who subsequently file suit is actually much smaller than previously thought, and the
proportion of suits thought to be without merit may, in fact, also be smaller.
10. See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Marlynn L. May & Daniel. B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors?  How Patients Han-
dle Medical Grievances,  24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105 (1990).  May and Stengel found that the seriousness
of injury was positively correlated with consulting a lawyer and filing suit, and that families who filed
claims were more likely to confront their treating physicians directly.  See id.
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viduals were more likely to sue if they believed that their doctors failed to show
concern for them as individuals.  In a separate study, Charles Vincent and oth-
ers found that decisions to take legal action were predicted both by the nature
of the injury and by what patients perceived to be insensitive handling and poor
communication after the original incident.12
Additional insight is provided by interviews with closed claimants.  In one
study, researchers interviewed 127 Florida families who had filed suit alleging
medical malfeasance in the perinatal period.13  All of the cases involved infants
who had experienced permanent neurodevelopmental injuries and/or death.
As a part of the interview, families were asked, “What prompted you to file a
malpractice claim?”  More than three-fourths of the respondents cited reasons
other than the need for money.14 One-third indicated they had been advised or
influenced to sue by someone outside the immediate family.15 Most often these
influential individuals were members of the medical profession.  One-fifth of
the respondents stated that they filed suit after deciding that forcing their phy-
sician onto the witness stand would be the only way they could ever find out
what really happened.16 The respondents also identified a number of communi-
cation difficulties with their physicians predating the adverse event in question.
One-fifth of the respondents stated that they filed suit when they suspected that
their physician was engaged in a cover-up concerning their child’s medical
care.17 A common response was “He would never tell us anything.  I decided he
must be hiding something.”  One-fifth of the respondents said they filed suit
“so that he won’t ever do this to anyone else.”18 Results of this study suggest
that persons who file suit are often as concerned about relationship issues with
their physicians as with the need for money.
Other studies supporting the development of an early identification and re-
sponse model of malpractice prevention are those that evaluate the claims his-
tories of physicians.  In evaluating the claims experiences of Florida physicians,
Frank Sloan and colleagues established that being sued for malpractice is not a
random phenomenon.19  According to their study, some physicians appear to
attract a disproportionate share of malpractice claims.  They reported that
within each specialty, three to eight percent of physicians were responsible for
75 to 85 percent of all payments for awards and settlements.  Moreover, an in-
dividual physician’s risk of being sued appears quite stable. Randall Bovbjerg
                                                          
12. See, e.g., Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors?  A Study of Patients and Rela-
tives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994).  The study involved 227 British patients and fami-
lies who were actively engaged in suing their treating physicians at the time of the interviews.
13. See Hickson et al., Factors, supra note 7, at 1360.  This study was made possible when Florida
enacted tort reform requiring centralized reporting of all claims filed in the state.  Up until that time, it
was difficult to conduct interviews with large numbers of claimants.
14. See id. at 1361
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Sloan et al., supra note 8.
HICKSON.FMT 04/01/98  8:07 AM
Page 7: Winter 1997]    EARLY RESPONSE MALPRACTICE PREVENTION 11
and Kenneth Petronis examined the claims experience of Florida physicians
during a baseline and subsequent period.20  Their study suggests that the past
does predict the future.  The studies of Sloan and Bovbjerg raise a number of
important questions: Why do certain physicians attract so many claims, and do
high suit physicians treat litigation prone populations?  No evidence supports
this popular idea. Do they treat more complex patients?  While practitioners of
some specialties certainly perform larger numbers of complicated cases, a dis-
proportionate share of suits are still filed against a small proportion of physi-
cians within those populations.  Perhaps the questions should focus not on pa-
tients but on physicians and their behavior.  Do physicians demonstrating a
high incidence of malpractice claims lack technical competence?  Or do they,
for whatever reason, merely have some difficulty connecting with their pa-
tients?
To examine these questions, researchers began by identifying the malprac-
tice claims experience of Florida obstetricians and then sorting the obstetricians
into high, low, or no malpractice risk groups.21 A sampling of deliveries
(n=1536) attended by these obstetricians was obtained from Florida Vital Sta-
tistics.  None of the families identified for the study had ever filed a malpractice
claim.  These families were contacted and asked to participate in a one-hour in-
terview.  As a part of the interview, women were asked their perceptions of the
care they received during and after their pregnancy.  A consistent pattern
emerged when researchers compared women’s perceptions of the care they re-
ceived to the malpractice risk experiences of their obstetricians.  Women who
were under the care of physicians having the highest number of malpractice
claims were significantly more likely to complain that they felt rushed, unin-
formed about certain tests, and basically ignored.  In response to the open-
ended question “what part of your care were you least satisfied with?,” women
seeing high malpractice risk physicians offered twice as many complaints as
those whose care was provided by a “no claims” physician.  Problems with phy-
sician-patient communication were the most commonly cited complaints.
As part of the study, families allowed researchers to obtain medical records
for the mother-infant pairs.  Stephen Entman and colleagues reviewed these
records with no knowledge of the treating physician’s malpractice risk group.22
                                                          
20. See Bovbjerg & Petronis, supra note 8.  The authors found that having only a single unpaid
claim during the baseline period doubled the odds of a claim during the follow up period.
21. See Stephen Entman et al., The Relationship Between Malpractice Claims History and Subse-
quent Obstetric Care, 272 JAMA 1588 (1994).  High malpractice risk physicians experienced at least
0.57 suits per year.  These physicians were further subdivided into two groups based upon the size of
payments and awards made on their behalf.  Patients whose doctors had high numbers of suits but less
than average payments said their physicians were not concerned about them as individuals.  See also
Hickson et al., Factors, supra note 7.
22. See Entman et al., supra note 21, at 1590.  There are several limitations of this study.  First, the
study was confined to chart reviews.  Documentation does not always reflect exactly what has oc-
curred.  Charting should occur contemporaneously with events, and problems may not be recognized
until after the fact.  Second, although Entman and colleagues reviewed 446 charts, many charts in-
volved reviews of infants with normal outcomes (328).  Consequently, it may be that differences exist
in the technical competence of high- versus no-malpractice risk obstetricians that could not be detected
based upon the limitations of the study.  However, if differences do exist, they are not of the same
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Objective and subjective assessments of the technical quality of care delivered
revealed no differences among the obstetricians assigned to the various mal-
practice risk groups.  Specifically, high, middle, and no malpractice risk physi-
cians could not be distinguished on the quality of their documentation, use of
ancillary tests, medical episodes with marginal or inadequate care, or by subjec-
tive judgment of the physician reviewers.
Do high malpractice risk physicians differ from their low risk colleagues
primarily by an inability to establish and maintain rapport?  Wendy Levinson
and her colleagues audio-taped a series of medical encounters between patients
and physicians.23  The encounters were analyzed by coders blind to the malprac-
tice experiences of the physicians.  When compared with physicians who had
been sued previously, primary care physicians with no malpractice claims
tended to use more statements of facilitation and orientation about the flow of
the visit.  In the affect domain, no-claims physicians used more humor in en-
counters than high risk physicians did.  The authors speculated that these tech-
niques made patients feel as though they were valued as individuals by their
physicians.  Physicians in the high malpractice risk group appear less able to
make their patients feel valued.
Results of numerous studies thus indicate that high malpractice risk relates
in large measure to both problems of establishing and maintaining rapport and
communicating effectively during critical moments.  If this is true, the questions
that arise are:  Is it possible to identify physicians at high risk for attracting
malpractice suits from something other than claims data?  If so, can changes in
interpersonal skills be promoted in order to reduce malpractice risk?
Many hospitals and large medical groups operate offices of patient affairs
(sometimes called ombudsmen or patient advocates) to receive complaints and
to respond to patient/family needs.  Some facilities centralize such reporting
and record complaints verbatim so that they may be forwarded to appropriate
personnel.  In these systems, patient complaints are typically considered one at
a time.  Many are forwarded directly to the physician(s) involved.  In other sys-
tems, complaints are directed to a physician chief of staff, who then forwards
the complaint to the involved party or parties.  Our first hypothesis is that by
analyzing complaints voluntarily offered by dissatisfied patients, one can iden-
tify a relatively small number of physicians who attract a large number of pa-
tient complaints. We also hypothesize that the allegations about these high
complaint physicians will be consistent with the complaint profiles of physicians
at high risk for malpractice claims, that is, failures of interpersonal aspects of
care.
                                                          
magnitude as the differences documented in physicians’ abilities to establish and maintain rapport with
their patients.
23. See, e.g., Wendy Levinson et al., The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary
Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553 (1997).  Although Levinson identified differences be-
tween claims and no-claims primary care physicians, her study failed to identify differences between
claims and no-claims surgeons.
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III
METHODS
A.  Subjects
Subjects for this study were members of a 717-member multispecialty phy-
sician group, all of whom were insured by the same malpractice carrier that also
covered the clinics and hospital in which the physicians worked.  The group in-
cluded primary and specialty physicians who are faculty of a medical school lo-
cated in a metropolitan area with a population of approximately 1.4 million
persons.
Approval for the study was obtained from the institution’s Committee for
the Protection of Human Subjects.  The study was agreed upon by representa-
tives of the medical group’s executive leadership, medical school department
chairs, hospital administration, office of risk management, insurance trust
committee, and quality assurance department.
B.  Procedures
1.  Data source.  The institution in which this study was conducted maintains
an Office of Patient Affairs (“OPA”) whose mission is to help patients with any
aspect of their experience with the medical center.  In addition to recording
compliments and assisting patients with a variety of hospitality services, the
OPA functions as an advocate for patients who have complaints or concerns
about medical services.  Since mid-1990, the OPA has maintained a
computerized database file in which every patient complaint is logged along
with the name of the person or persons alleged to have caused the problem (if
known), what steps were taken to investigate and resolve the problem, and the
outcome (if known).  The OPA routinely forwards patient complaints and
comments to the parties allegedly responsible and, if the complaint involves an
allegation that someone was harmed, forwards them to the Office of Risk
Management for review and action.  OPA complaint files from July 1990
through December 1995 constituted the raw data for this study.
2.  Patient Complaint Analysis System.  OPA patient complaint data were
scored according to a Patient Complaint Analysis System (“PCAS”), which
characterizes the nature of the dissatisfaction with medical care and identifies
the alleged offender(s).  The PCAS allows judges to choose among 35
operationally defined complaint categories drawn from patient satisfaction
studies.24  Consistent with previous research, each complaint is assigned to one
                                                          
24. See, e.g., Linda A. Anderson & Marc A. Zimmerman, Patient and Physician Perceptions of
Their Relationship and Patient Satisfaction, 20 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 27 (1993); Judith A.
Hall & Michael C. Dornan, Meta-Analysis of Satisfaction with Medical Care: Description of Research
Domain and Analysis of Overall Satisfaction Levels, 27 SOC. SCI. & MED. 637 (1988); Judith A. Hall &
Michael C. Dornan, What Patients Like about Their Medical Care and How Often They Are Asked: A
Meta-Analysis of the Satisfaction Literature, 27 SOC. SCI. & MED. 935 (1988); Barbara M. Korsch et al.,
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of thirty-five specific categories subsumed under six general types, including
physician communication, humaneness, care and treatment, access and
availability, environment, or billing problems.  (See Tables 1 & 2)  Inter-rater
reliabilities in initial norming studies ranged from 0.78 to 0.93, reflecting good
agreement among judges responsible for assigning complaints to categories.
Three judges used the PCAS Coding Manual to code all patient complaints
contained in 8,329 OPA complaint reports compiled during the target time pe-
riod (for example, “the doctor was rude,” “the doctor didn’t give me enough
information about how to take care of myself,” etc.).  Raters also identified the
person allegedly responsible for each complaint.  Codes were entered on hard
copy to provide flexibility in doing reliability studies.  Pre-study reliabilities for
the three judges ranged from 0.68 to 0.97 and averaged 0.87, reflecting ade-
quate agreement among raters for most complaints.  A second reliability check
conducted during the coding yielded inter-rater reliabilities of 0.77 to 0.99 and
averaged 0.88.  Test-retest reliabilities on a sample of 30 patient complaints
judged a month apart averaged 0.90, reflecting good consistency within individ-
ual raters over time.  Inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities of identification of
the alleged offender were consistently high, 0.96 to 0.99.  Because of the sensi-
tive nature of the study, two raters reviewed every complaint and its coding.
Differences were resolved by consensus among the two raters or by using the
third judge as a tie-breaker.
The next step was to create a complaint-based computerized database con-
taining the individual coded complaints.  The database also contained variables
that identified the report, the person alleged to have given each offense, and
the responsible doctor or supervisor (attending physician or unit director).  The
database contained 13,673 complaint events, 2,248 of which identified an at-
tending physician as the alleged offender.
                                                          
Gaps in Doctor-Patient Communication: Doctor-Patient Interaction and Patient Satisfaction, 42
PEDIATRICS 855 (1968); Debra L. Roter et al., Patient-Physician Communication: A Descriptive Sum-
mary of the Literature, 12 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 99 (1988); John E. Ware, Jr. & Ron D.
Hays, Methods for Measuring Patient Satisfaction with Specific Medical Encounters, 26 MED. CARE 393
(1988); John E. Ware et al., Dimensions of Patient Attitudes Regarding Doctors and Medical Care
Services, 13 MED. CARE 669 (1975); Michael J. Weaver et al., A Questionnaire for Patients’ Evalua-
tions of Their Physicians’ Humanistic Behavior, 8 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 135 (1993); Matthew H.
Wolf et al., The Medical Interview Satisfaction Scale: Development of a Scale to Measure Patient Per-
ceptions of Physician Behavior, 1 J. BEHAV. MED. 391 (1978).  Multiple studies have sought to define
the various domains of patient satisfaction.  Although there is consistency about these domains across
the various studies, the real challenge is how satisfaction is assessed in any given patient.  Most satis-
faction instruments that have emerged from this research utilize closed-ended questions in which indi-
viduals are asked the extent to which they agree or disagree with a given statement.  The problem with
such a methodology is that, in general, it does not allow patients to indicate those issues that are of
greatest concern and may not capture real complaints at all if the patients do not understand the
statement or if the evaluator has not anticipated the particular source of dissatisfaction.  See, e.g., Ste-
phen Bruster et al., National Survey of Hospital Patients, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 1542 (1994).  It is our
strong belief that the most effective methods of assessing satisfaction utilize open-ended responses
with subsequent analysis.
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C.  Results
The major question was whether patient complaints were equally distrib-
uted across all physicians.  Figure 1 illustrates that 90% of the members of the
physician group were named in fewer than ten patient complaints during the
study period, and no complaints were recorded for 40% of the members of the
group.  The 641 physicians with few or no complaints were arbitrarily defined
as “low-complaint physicians.”  The remaining 76 physicians (just over 10% of
the population) were defined as “high-complaint physicians.”
FIGURE 1
CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLAINTS
FOR 717 PROVIDERS
Table 1 contains the raw numbers of complaints (by general class and spe-
cific type) made by patients or family members who identified physicians by
name.  Complaints are presented separately for low-complaint and high-
complaint physicians.  Table 2 presents the proportions of complaints for both
groups of physicians within each code.  The data show that the High-Complaint
physicians, 10% of the group, disproportionately accounted for two-thirds of
patient complaints overall and for approximately two thirds of each type of pa-
tient complaint.
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TABLE 1
RAW NUMBERS OF COMPLAINTS
MD Group
< 10
Complaints
>=10
Complaints ALL
Code Class Code n=641 MDs n=76 MDs n=717 MDs
Communication
Poor Communication
Paper/Chart Problem
Did Not Listen
Poor MD-MD
Communication
MD “Jousting”
Lied To, Misled
Who’s In Charge
MD Uniformed
Confidence Breach
Made Me Worry
Communication Too
Personal
Lewd Behavior
125
40
26
19
16
7
2
6
3
4
1
1
·
278
107
44
35
32
22
11
6
8
5
6
1
1
403
147
70
54
48
29
13
12
11
9
7
2
1
Care &
Treatment Treatment Problem
Diagnosis Problem
Adverse Outcome
Incompetent
Discharge Problem
Medication Problem
240
81
67
29
39
18
6
434
161
103
69
42
37
22
674
242
170
98
81
55
28
Humaneness
MD Rude
MD Discriminated
MD Yelled At Patient
Patient Felt Coerced
MD Blamed Patient
Rough Handling
MD Assaulted Patient
64
35
19
3
2
3
1
1
95
60
25
4
3
2
1
·
159
95
44
7
5
5
2
1
Access
Made Me Wait
Refused Access
Calls Not Returned
Continuity Of Care
Was Rushed
59
30
13
5
5
6
153
80
32
19
11
11
212
110
45
24
16
17
Environment
Unsafe Environment
Meal Problems
Parking Problems
5
5
·
·
7
4
2
1
12
9
2
1
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MD Group
< 10
Complaints
>=10
Complaints ALL
Code Class Code n=641 MDs n=76 MDs n=717 MDs
Billing/Payment
$ Adjustment
Requested
$ Adjustment Granted
281
149
132
507
280
227
788
429
359
ALL 774 1474 2248
TABLE 2
PROPORTIONS OF COMPLAINTS WITHIN EACH CODE
MD GROUP
< 10 COMPLAINTS >=10 COMPLAINTS
CODE CLASS CODE n=641 MDs n=76 MDs
Communication
Poor Communication
Paper/Chart Problem
Did Not Listen
Poor MD-MD Communication
MD “Jousting”
Lied To, Misled
Who’s In Charge
MD Uniformed
Confidence Breach
Made Me Worry
Communication Too Personal
Lewd Behavior
31%
27%
37%
35%
33%
24%
15%
50%
27%
44%
14%
50%
·
69%
 73%
63%
65%
67%
76%
85%
50%
73%
56%
86%
50%
100%
Care &
Treatment Treatment Problem
Diagnosis Problem
Adverse Outcome
Incompetent
Discharge Problem
Medication Problem
36%
33%
39%
30%
48%
33%
21%
64%
 67%
61%
70%
52%
67%
79%
Humaneness
MD Rude
MD Discriminated
MD Yelled At Patient
Patient Felt Coerced
MD Blamed Patient
Rough Handling
MD Assaulted Patient
40%
37%
43%
43%
40%
60%
50%
100%
60%
63%
57%
57%
60%
40%
50%
·
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MD GROUP
< 10 COMPLAINTS >=10 COMPLAINTS
CODE CLASS CODE n=641 MDs n=76 MDs
Access
Made Me Wait
Refused Access
Calls Not Returned
Continuity Of Care
Was Rushed
28%
27%
29%
21%
31%
35%
72%
73%
71%
79%
69%
65%
Environment
Unsafe Environment
Meal Problems
Parking Problems
42%
56%
·
·
58%
44%
100%
100%
Billing/Payment
$ Adjustment Requested
$ Adjustment Granted
36%
35%
37%
64%
65%
63%
ALL 34.0% 66.0%
What were patients’ most common complaints?  Table 3 depicts the overall
proportions of each type of complaint.  Complaints about bills led the list, fol-
lowed by care and treatment issues.  Concerns about communication, humane-
ness, and access issues followed.  Complaints about environmental concerns
rarely mentioned physicians by name.
Among patients’ complaints about their bills were the following: they had
been charged excessively for the services provided; they never saw a physician
whose name appeared on the bill; they were billed for a treatment that had
caused harm; they were charged for someone else’s care; or they were cared for
by “lower level” health care providers but were billed for an attending physi-
cian’s time.
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TABLE 3
OVERALL PROPORTIONS OF EACH TYPE OF COMPLAINT
MD Group
< 10
Complaints
>=10
Complaints ALL
Code Class Code n=641 MDs n=76 MDs n=717 MDs
Communication
Poor Communication
Paper/Chart Problem
Did Not Listen
Poor MD-MD
Communication
MD “Jousting”
Lied To, Misled
Who’s In Charge
MD Uniformed
Confidence Breach
Made Me Worry
Communication Too
Personal
Lewd Behavior
6.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.7%
0.3%
0.1%
0.3%
0.1%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
·
12.0%
 5.0%
2.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.5%
0.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.3%
0.0%
0.0%
18.0%
7.0%
3.0%
2.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.6%
0.5%
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.0%
Care &
Treatment Treatment Problem
Diagnosis Problem
Adverse Outcome
Incompetent
Discharge Problem
Medication Problem
11%
4.0%
3.0%
1.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.3%
19.0%
 7.0%
5.0%
3.0%
2.0%
2.0%
1.0%
30.0%
11.0%
8.0%
4.0%
4.0%
2.0%
1.0%
Humaneness
MD Rude
MD Discriminated
MD Yelled At Patient
Patient Felt Coerced
MD Blamed Patient
Rough Handling
MD Assaulted Patient
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.1%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
4.0%
3.0%
1.0%
0.2%
0.1%
0.1%
0.0%
·
7.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
Access
Made Me Wait
Refused Access
Calls Not Returned
Continuity Of Care
Was Rushed
3.0%
1.0%
0.6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.3%
7.0%
4.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.5%
0.5%
9.0%
5.0%
2.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%
Environment
Unsafe Environment
Meal Problems
Parking Problems
0.0%
0.2%
·
·
0.0%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
1.0%
0.4%
0.1%
0.0%
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MD Group
< 10
Complaints
>=10
Complaints ALL
Code Class Code n=641 MDs n=76 MDs n=717 MDs
Billing/Payment
$ Adjustment
Requested
$ Adjustment Granted
13.0%
7.0%
6.0%
23.0%
12.0%
10.0%
35.0%
19.0%
16.0%
ALL 34.0% 66.0% 100%
Examples of patient complaints about care and treatment include the fol-
lowing:
(1) Treatment problem: The patient complained that the doctor put
her on a new medication and did not monitor her for two months.
(2) Medication problem: A father states that his 18 month-old son
was given ten times the amount of a drug than was intended.
(3) Adverse or poor outcome: “My wife went back to Dr. L who told
her that her pain was scar tissue.  He removed the scar tissue and
now she says the pain is worse.”
Patients’ complaints about communication issues are similar to the follow-
ing:
(1) The Doctor seemed uninformed about the case: “The doctor my
daughter saw didn’t know her medical history and didn’t appear to
have read any of the chart.”  “The staff asked [my father] to sign pa-
pers that he already signed and would have repeated CT scans if dad
had not reminded them that he brought copies from the other hospi-
tal.”
(2) Poor Communication: “She was…concerned that D’s surgeons
did not talk with the family after surgery was completed.”  “Several
EEG’s and a CAT scan were done and we couldn’t get information
about the results from Neurology.”
(3) Lied to, misled: “Mrs. D says that Dr. H told them that the
thumb could not be saved because it was too jagged.  She wonders if
it was not saved because of the five-hour delay before they began
surgery.”
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(4) Did not listen: “Mom says she has been trying for months to
convince Dr. A that her child has a problem with his knee, but Dr. A
just says it’s fine.”
(5) Made me worry: “Mrs. U says that the residents ‘scared me to
death’ by telling her that the suture lines on her baby were multiple
fractures.”
(6) Doctor jousting: “Dr. J told me, ‘It will probably take a week to
get your blood work back.  This place is very inefficient.  You can’t
imagine how inefficient this place is.’”  “She says her son’s doctors
told her he had gotten the initial infection in the OR and that it was
probably from one of the team members who did not wash their
hands well after having a BM.”
Patients are hurt and angered when their care lacks essential humaneness,
as in the following examples:
(1) Doctor was rude: “I felt as if I were being reprimanded by ques-
tioning the delay (in instituting my daughter’s treatment)….  Dr. X
seemed unconcerned and arrogant.”
(2) Doctor angry, yelled at patient:  “Mrs. B states that Dr. G was
screaming at her husband at one point.”  “Dr. V never raised his
voice but spit out his words like bullets.  It was obvious that he was
angry.”
Access issues resulting in patient complaints were like the following:
(1) Made me wait, Doctor was not available: “Dr. C did not visit
mother until the day she was discharged.”  “The patient’s father says
his daughter got extremely sick, so he was given an appointment at
noon.  He says he waited five hours before they saw a physician.”
(2) Was rushed: “After complaining about lack of thoroughness in
the exam, the mom said Dr. K’s exam was hasty and did not last
more than five minutes.”
(3) Calls not returned: “She said that she…left numerous messages
and rarely received a return call during her lengthy illness.”
(4) Refused access: “Mr. I says that now he can’t get an appointment
in the clinic because he’s missed several appointments.”  “Attempts
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were made for her to see another MD who refused to see her since
she is Dr. G’s patient.”
While complaints about the medical environment rarely mentioned physi-
cians by name, patients often perceive that the environment may adversely af-
fect their physicians’ abilities to care for them.  For example:
(1) Unsafe, inefficient environment: “The patient complained that
the ED was filthy and disorganized.”  “Mr. K was admitted for a CT
scan, but was unable to have the testing done because the CT scan-
ner was down.”
(2) Meal problems: “Mrs. W states that despite being a diabetic who
needs to eat on time, her meal tray was not delivered until 9 p.m. the
day she was admitted.”
(3) Parking problem: “Mr. Q states that by the time he found a
parking place and walked all the way back to the clinic, his wife had
already been seen, and none of his questions had been addressed.”
IV
DISCUSSION
Systematic analysis of patient and family complaints recorded in an office of
patient affairs revealed that a small percentage of physicians in a large multi-
specialty group attracted a disproportionate share of complaints.  “High-
Complaint” physicians (10% of the group) accounted for approximately two-
thirds of the complaints concerning the quality of physician communication,
care and treatment, humaneness, access to care, the environment, and billing.
This finding is consistent with the results from a previous study, in which a
small number of high-malpractice physicians accounted for disproportionate
numbers of patient complaints.25  The types of complaints about physicians in
this current study were also similar to those recorded for obstetricians in the
Florida study mentioned above.26
Why do certain physicians attract larger numbers of patient complaints?
The answer may be similar to why a relatively small group of physicians attract
so many malpractice suits.  It may be that both high-complaint and high-
malpractice risk physicians simply have difficulty establishing and maintaining
rapport with their patients.  Reasons for this difficulty are clearly multifactorial
and relate to the physician’s beliefs and attitude, family of origin influences,
gender, and sociocultural influences.27  Furthermore, some physicians who func-
                                                          
25. See Hickson et al., Obstetricians, supra note 7.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Glynis Bean & Louise H. Kidder, Helping and Achieving. Compatible or Competing
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tion adequately in routine settings may be challenged to maintain relationships
in certain clinical situations, including dealing with difficult and dying patients,
and when mistakes have been made.28  Yet from a risk management perspec-
tive, these are the very situations when rapport must be optimal.
Are there other reasons that certain physicians attract more complaints?
One possibility is that they care for large numbers of patients or deliver large
dollar volumes of service.  Examination of patient encounters and relative
value units (“RBRVs”)29 of service delivered by high and low-complaint physi-
cians in the current study revealed a modest positive correlation (r=.34, p<.05).
However, only twelve percent of the variation in complaints was explained by
RBRVs (r2=.12).  In other words, the quantity of patient care delivered by a
physician plays only a minor role in his being named in greater numbers of
complaints.
Another possibility is that differences in patient complaints occurred based
upon the type of medicine practiced (that is, surgery vs. nonsurgery).  Wendy
Levinson and Debra Roter have documented differences between surgeons and
nonsurgeons with respect to their communications skills.30  We, however, could
identify no significant correlation between physician complaint numbers and
the specialty practiced.  Similarly, no differences were identified based upon
physician gender or length of practice.  This is not to say that differences do not
                                                          
Goals for Men and Women in Medical School?,  16 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1377 (1982); David Field & An-
gela Lennox, Gender in Medicine: The Views of First and Fifth Year Medical Students, 30 MED. EDUC.
246 (1996); Daniel H. Funkenstein, The Learning and Personal Development of Medical Students and
the Recent Changes in Universities and Medical Schools, 43 J. MED. EDUC. 883 (1968); A. A. Marshall
& Robert C. Smith, Physicians’ Emotional Reactions to Patients: Recognizing and Managing Counter-
transference, 90 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 4 (1995);  Laeth S. Nasir, Evidence of Discrimination
Against International Medical Graduates Applying to Family Practice Residency Programs, 26 FAM.
MED. 625 (1994); Dennis H. Novack et al., Calibrating the Physician, 278 JAMA 502 (1997).
28. See generally, C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE (1979);
James E. Groves, Taking Care of the Hateful Patient, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 883 (1978); David Hil-
fiker, Facing our Mistakes, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 118 (1984); Dennis H. Novack, Active Management
of Problem Patients, 50 BRIT. J. HOSP. MED. 573 (1993); Dennis H. Novack, A Controlled Trial to Im-
prove Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences
for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995); Dennis H. Novack, Adri-
enne, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 424 (1993).  In situations involving adverse patient outcomes, phy-
sicians may be perceived to withdraw from the patient and family.  Sometimes families assume that the
withdrawal occurs because care has not been exemplary or that there is something to hide.  This may
be particularly problematic for primary care physicians whose patients were admitted to intensive care
units and must turn care over to someone else.  In such circumstances, the primary physician may feel
like a fifth wheel.  Families may not see their former doctor and may, subsequently, misunderstand
statements made by unit staff and come to believe that poor care was delivered prior to admission.  In
these circumstances, families may be prompted to file suit.
29. See generally William C. Hsiao et al., Results, Potential Effects, and Implementation Issues of
the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale, 260 JAMA 2429 (1988).  Hsiao and his colleagues developed
the resource-based relative value scale based on the resource input costs of services and procedures
delivered by physicians in eighteen major specialty areas.  The resource cost of a physician’s service
consists of (1) the time consumed in providing a service or procedure; (2) the intensity of the work,
defined to include the mental effort, judgment, technical skill, and stress involved; (3) the amortized
cost of physician training; and (4) the overhead cost of practice.
30. See Levinson & Roter., supra note 7.
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exist.  After all, only 717 physicians were studied, and, perhaps, examination of
a larger physician population would identify factors that contribute to differ-
ences in complaint generation.  In the meantime, ten percent of the physicians
studied stand out in terms of attracting patient complaints.  Our hypothesis is
that they will also stand out in terms of their malpractice risk.  This hypothesis
is being addressed in a subsequent study.
Two tools created as part of our work deserve mention.  The first is the de-
velopment of the PCAS, which was designed to systematically analyze pa-
tient/family complaint narratives.  Unlike traditional patient satisfaction ques-
tionnaires with closed-ended responses that principally serve institutional
marketing purposes, the PCAS captures potential problems in patients’ and
families’ own words, and allows identification of alleged offenders and/or serv-
ices, and allows aggregation of complaints over time.  Our evaluation of the
PCAS also indicated that research assistants with limited or no medical back-
ground exhibited acceptable inter-rater and test-retest reliability in coding
complaints.
The second tool that deserves mention is based on the aggregated com-
plaint data.  Specifically, the distribution of complaints alleged against each
physician forms the basis for a “report card” that can be presented to high-
complaint physicians.  The report card is composed of a graph that depicts an
index of complaints received per unit of time (x-axis) and the number of physi-
cian group members with that complaint value (y-axis).  The individual’s com-
plaint score is highlighted so that the physician can see how he or she compares
with peers.  Representative quotes from patient complaints and a listing of the
most common types of complaints alleged against the physician complete the
report card.  These report cards are being used in an intervention study where
respected peers share the data on the report card with high-complaint physi-
cians and seek to learn the nature of the problems, if any, that underlie the
complaints.  The study hypothesis is that such an intervention will influence
positive behavioral changes in some physicians.  Pilot testing suggests that half
of those who receive the intervention will demonstrate change.
Improving physician practice behavior has been the subject of increasing in-
terest over the past two decades, as society attempts to cope with the ever in-
creasing cost of medical care.  Review of the medical literature concerning how
to promote change suggests at least six methods: education, feedback, partici-
pation by physicians in efforts to bring about change, administrative rules and
regulations, financial incentives, and penalties.31  The first line of intervention in
our current project involves the first three methods: education, feedback, and
physician participation.  Specifically, our hypothesis is that “report cards” that
graphically compare the complaint experience of one doctor with his or her
peers will serve as an effective educational and feedback tool via their presen-
tation and discussion by respected and respectful colleagues.  Should changes
                                                          
31. See, e.g., Peter J. Greco & John M. Eisenberg, Changing Physicians’ Practices, 329 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1271 (1993) (summarizing research on changing physician behavior).
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not occur, the second line of intervention will include elements drawn from the
latter three strategies: administrative rules, financial incentives, and penalties.
Education and feedback provide physicians with information about how
their  practice compares with others or with some accepted practice guideline.
Feedback has been effective in reducing hospital lengths of stay, the number or
types of medications prescribed, outpatient tests ordered, and increasing com-
pliance with health promotion guidelines.32  Other studies, however, have
shown that feedback has little effect.33  Review of the feedback literature sug-
gests that there is at least one prerequisite before physicians will alter practice
behavior:  They must recognize the need for change.  If a meaningful relation-
ship between patient complaints and malpractice-related risk management ac-
tivity can be established, such an outcome is likely to provide high-complaint
physicians (and their administrators and insurers) with clear and convincing
evidence of the need for change.
The research on physician behavior change suggests that “report cards”
should be shared in a sensitive and supportive way by a respected colleague.
Such a method of providing feedback is likely to be far more effective than
simply mailing the report cards periodically or having them shared by non-
physician personnel from the OPA, the risk management department, the mal-
practice insurer, or the medical group administration.34
Over the past two decades, interest has developed in the use of clinical
                                                          
32. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick & Kathryn L. Coltin, Feedback Reduces Test Use in a Health
Maintenance Organization, 255 JAMA 1450 (1986); John E. Billi et al., The Effects of a Low-Cost In-
tervention Program on Hospital Costs, 7 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 411 (1992); Kurt Kroenke & Ellen
M. Pinholt, Reducing Polypharmacy in the Elderly: A Controlled Trail of Physician Feedback, 38 J.
AMER. GERIATRIC SOC’Y 31 (1990); Linda M. Frazier et al., Can Physician Education Lower the Cost
of Prescription Drugs?  A Prospective, Controlled Trial, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 116 (1991);
Larry M. Manheim et al., Training House Officers to be Cost Conscious: Effects of an Educational In-
tervention on Charges and Length of Stay, 28 MED. CARE 29 (1990); Stephen J. McPhee et al., Pro-
moting Cancer Screening: A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Three Interventions, 149 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1866 (1989).  Physicians tend to move toward the norm.  Managed care organizations
have found that providing physicians with financial report cards effectively reduces excess care per-
ceived to be of limited value.  Increasingly, physicians have become accustomed to receiving report
cards that compare their patients’ medical costs with those of other physicians in the given plan.
33. See, e.g., Charles O. Hershey et al., The Effect of Computerized Feedback Coupled with a
Newsletter upon Outpatient Prescribing Charges: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 26 MED. CARE 88
(1988); Thomas J. Meyer et al., Reduction of Polypharmacy by Feedback to Clinicians, 6 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 133 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Wayne A. Ray et al., Persistence of Improvement in Antibiotic Prescribing in Office
Practice, 253 JAMA 1774 (1985); William Schaffner et al., Improving Antibiotic Prescribing in Office
Practice: A Controlled Trial of Three Educational Methods, 250 JAMA 1728 (1983).  Ray and Schaff-
ner conducted a series of studies designed to reduce inappropriate prescribing of chloramphenicol and
tetracycline for young children.  Inappropriate prescribing was identified through the use of a Medi-
caid database that linked child, physician, and filled prescription.  Physicians found themselves con-
fronted with data about their own prescribing as well as information about the contraindications for
these drugs in young children (aplastic anemia, dental staining).  The method by which the information
was delivered appeared to be the key.  Physicians who received feedback by mail demonstrated no
change in prescribing.  They probably discarded the information in the circular file.  Those who re-
ceived the information from a colleague, however, demonstrated changes in prescribing that persisted
over time.  It is hard to imagine how physicians would fail to reconsider their prescribing habits when
faced by a respected member of the profession who is armed with data.
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practice guidelines or practice standards to reduce needless or wasteful varia-
tion in care or to identify and eliminate inappropriate care.  Although countless
documents have been produced, guidelines in themselves have had only modest
effects in promoting changes in practice behavior.35  However, when guidelines
or practice standards are delivered by a respected peer or “opinion leader,”
there is often a marked effect.36  In one study, the rate of cesarean sections was
dramatically reduced when opinion leaders were recruited, trained, and then
returned to their medical communities to educate their colleagues.37  In another
study, Wayne Ray and colleagues, using a process known as “academic detail-
ing,” visited practicing physicians and shared information about their inappro-
priate prescribing.38  They then observed changes in prescribing that persisted
over time. A dramatic effect was not observed when information concerning
inappropriate prescribing was simply forwarded via mail or shared by nursing
personnel.39
The early identification and response model of malpractice prevention fol-
lows, in part, on the studies by Ray and colleagues.  Specifically, each high-
complaint physician will be visited by a respected physician colleague who will
be responsible for sharing the “report card,” discussing the reasons that might
underlie patient complaints, and building in follow-up accountability.
Such an intervention program would not be complete, however, unless it
were coupled with targeted programs of continuing medical education and with
resources necessary to assess office practice and organization or train those
who request assistance with improving their communication skills.  The re-
search team anticipates that physicians who recognize that they stand out from
the norm may begin to think about ways to improve patients’ perceptions of
their practices.  The fact that a physician recognizes that they stand out may
make them more receptive to programs of risk management education, and,
therefore, may make those educational programs far more effective, especially
when the high-complaint physician recognizes the need for change.
Although our hypothesis is that the early identification and response model
will be effective in promoting behavioral changes of many high-complaint phy-
sicians, not everyone will respond.  Some physicians, for whatever reason, will
be unable or unwilling to respond.  In such circumstances, what alternatives
might medical leadership have in dealing with these high-complaint physicians?
One approach would be to do nothing.  The leaders could simply be content
with the fact that many, if not most, physicians had changed behavior and per-
haps, as a result, reduced patient dissatisfaction and lowered the medical
                                                          
35. See Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health Consensus Develop-
ment Program on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA 2708 (1987).
36. See Jonathan Lomas et al., Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice?  The Effect of a Consensus
Statement on the Practice of Physicians, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1306 (1989).
37. See Jonathan Lomas et al., Opinion Leaders vs. Audit and Feedback to Implement Practice
Guidelines: Delivery after Previous Caesarean Section, 265 JAMA 2202 (1991).
38. See Wayne A. Ray et al., supra note 34; see also William Schaffner et al., supra note 34.
39. See id.
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group’s collective malpractice risk.
Another approach might involve intensifying peer pressure.  Chiefs of clini-
cal services, departmental chairs, or hospital administrators might be brought
into the process.  Physicians with high complaint scores could be encouraged to
change or face more intensive monitoring.  Medical leadership might consider
use of financial incentives or disincentives based on physicians’ relative per-
formances.  Physicians who score well might be rewarded, and/or those who
perform poorly might be penalized.  Money has long been recognized as a pow-
erful motivator of physician behavior.40
Finally, it is conceivable that for those few physicians who are absolutely re-
sistant to change, in spite of peer pressure and/or financial incentives, medical
groups might seek to take administrative action, including limiting the practice
privileges of high-complaint physicians or dismissing nonresponding physicians
from the medical group.  When such action is contemplated, the group needs to
recognize they face potential legal action and should conduct themselves in
ways designed to reduce their risk.
V
MALPRACTICE PREVENTION AND THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT
Hospitals and physician groups can pursue many strategies to change physi-
cian behavior.  They can require that physicians be monitored, they can restrict
privileges, and ultimately, they can deny or revoke physicians’ credentials to
practice in their facility or group.  Physicians subjected to these sanctions often
sue, alleging such claims as defamation, interference with contractual relations,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and antitrust violations such as mo-
nopolization.41 Often hospitals and physician groups can prevail on the merits in
                                                          
40. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Physician Reimbursement by Salary or Fee-for-Service: Ef-
fect on Physician Practice Behavior in a Randomized Prospective Study, 80 PEDIATRICS 344 (1987);
Alan L. Hillman, How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians’ Clinical Decisions and the Financial
Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989).  Although most
people believe that money affects physician behavior, there has been relatively little empirical re-
search on the issue.  Hickson and colleagues conducted the only truly randomized study on reim-
bursement effects on physician practice behavior.  In this study, pediatric residents were randomly as-
signed to receive either a very small ($2.00) fee for each patient they attended or a salary supplement
for their clinical activities.  Patients who were assigned to fee-for-service physicians experienced 20%
more visits during the nine-month study than patients who were attended by salaried physicians.  The
greatest difference in the number of visits was for general health maintenance. Patients seeing fee-for-
service physicians completed 40% more well child visits than patients seeing salaried physicians.
Analyses of each visit revealed that patients assigned to fee-for-service physicians were more likely to
have well child visits judged to be in excess of American Academy of Pediatrics standards and were
significantly less likely to miss indicated visits.  Patients seeing salaried physicians received almost no
care judged to be excessive.  They did, however, miss numerous indicated visits.  Perhaps most inter-
esting, after completion of the study, the residents were asked, “How did your method of reimburse-
ment influence your practice behavior?”  The response was unanimous.  All subjects denied that pay-
ment had any influence on what they did.  Physicians may often be unaware of environmental factors
that influence their decision making.
41. See generally Barry. R. Furrow et al., Quality Assurance and Risk Management, in HEALTH
LAW 158-254 (1995); Barry R. Furrow et al., The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, in
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such suits if they can demonstrate that statements made about a physician were
true or that the physician suffered no antitrust injury.  Even so, the threat of
such litigation can pose a real deterrent to physicians and hospitals that wish to
promote physician behavior modifications.
Fortunately, both states42 and the federal government have passed laws to
protect such peer review activities.43  Among the most important of these is the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act (“HCQIA”)44  Under the Act, profes-
sional peer review bodies45 and their members are immune from state and fed-
eral liability for any professional review action undertaken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality health care;
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter;
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the physician in-
volved or after such other procedures as are fair to the physician under the circum-
stances; and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after
such reasonable efforts to obtain facts and after meeting the requirement of para-
graph (3).
46
These review actions include any actions “based on the competence or pro-
fessional conduct of any individual physician (which conduct affects or could
affect adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients), and which af-
fects (or may affect) adversely the clinical privileges” of the physician.47  Those
who provide information to such bodies are similarly immune from liability
unless they conveyed information that they knew to be false.48
One question that might arise is whether problems with physicians’ com-
munication and other interpersonal skills pose enough of a threat to patients’
health and welfare to warrant HCQIA protection.  In most reported cases, im-
munity is applied when physicians are dismissed because their practice patterns
                                                          
HEALTH LAW 555-676 (1995) [hereinafter, Furrow et al., The Health Care Quality Improvement Act] ;
Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act, 28 AM. BUS. L.J 683, 697-98 (1991).
42. See Furrow et al., The Health Care Quality Improvement Act, supra note 41, at 555-676.
43. Note, Defending the System: Application of the Intra-enterprise Immunity Doctrine in Physician
Peer Review Antitrust Cases, 75 TEX. L. REV. 409 (1996).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§11101-11152 (1997).
45. This term is defined as a “health care entity and the governing body or any committee of a
health care entity which conducts professional review activity, and includes any committee of the
medical staff of such an entity when assisting the governing body in a professional review activity.”  42
U.S.C. § 11151(11) (1997).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (1997).  The conditions that must be met by hospitals for notice and
hearing are set forth in § 11112(b).  By contrast, physician groups and HMOs are covered only if they
have a formal peer review process as defined in 45 CFR § 60.2; 42 U.S.C. § 11151(4)(A)(i),(ii) (1997).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (1997).  Note that the statute does explicitly exclude some activities from
being considered as evidence of the physician’s competence, such as participation in a prepaid health
plan or being salaried, but none of these apply to concerns about patients’ complaints about their phy-
sicians’ communication skills and care.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(2) (1997).
HICKSON.FMT 04/01/98  8:07 AM
Page 7: Winter 1997]    EARLY RESPONSE MALPRACTICE PREVENTION 29
pose a risk of physical harm to their patients.49  However, at least one court has
allowed a hospital to obtain immunity from claims by a physician who was fired
for abusive and disruptive behavior,50 and it seems clear that poor physician-
patient relationships can adversely affect patients’ welfare.  Thus, efforts to im-
prove physicians’ interactions should be included within the peer review
mechanism of the institution or group to minimize the risk of liability.
VI
CONCLUSION
Many physicians view themselves as victimized by the current system of
medical dispute resolution in the United States, often pointing to legal deci-
sions they believe are inconsistent with “the facts of the case.”  These physi-
cians simply do not appreciate the differences between the standards of medi-
cal/scientific proof and the standards of legal proof.  They feel victimized
because courtroom standards of proof seem less rigorous and more variable.
Institutions, insurers, and physician groups that make it a policy to share aggre-
gated patient complaint data with their doctors may help avoid litigation based
less on breach of duty than breach of etiquette.
The proposed project is significant for several reasons.  First, it provides a
vehicle for teaching the medical community about the compelling relationship
between patients’ dissatisfactions with interpersonal aspects of care and their
decisions to file suit.  Second, the early identification and response model pro-
vides medical groups with a tool that may be utilized to identify peers who need
targeted intervention.  Third, physicians in the new medical market are placing
increasing emphasis on customer satisfaction and the need to promote good
relationships.  Fourth, data from such a model might complement information
available from the National Practitioner Data Bank.51  Although Data Bank in-
formation is important, it focuses on a physician’s claims experience without
capturing the reasons underlying those claims (patient satisfaction being one
important component of the care process).  Finally, patient complaints are
more frequent than lawsuits, allowing, we believe, earlier and potentially more
economically efficient interventions.  The policy implication is clear: Peer re-
view efforts should include early identification and response systems for re-
ducing patient dissatisfaction in the hopes of reducing malpractice claims.
                                                          
49. See Bruce P. Ogden, How to Terminate a Physician’s Clinical Privileges Without Paying Him a
Million Dollars: The HCQIA’s Federal Peer Review and Data Bank Reporting Immunities, 9 HEALTH
LAW. 11 (1997); Kenneth G. Starling, Antitrust Defenses in Physician Peer Review Cases, 63 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 399 (1995).
50. See, e.g., Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg. Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 1400 (1995).
51. See, e.g., Robert E. Oshel et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: The First 4 Years, 110
PUB. HEALTH REP. 383 (1995).
